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Abstract
Humans excel in categorization. Yet from a computational standpoint, learn-
ing a novel probabilistic classification task involves severe computational
challenges. The present paper investigates one way to address these chal-
lenges: assuming class-conditional independence of features. This feature in-
dependence assumption simplifies the inference problem, allows for informed
inferences about novel feature combinations, and performs robustly across
different statistical environments. We designed a new Bayesian classification
learning model (the dependence-independence structure and category learn-
ing model, DISC-LM) that incorporates varying degrees of prior belief in
class-conditional independence, learns whether or not independence holds,
and adapts its behavior accordingly. Theoretical results from two simulation
studies demonstrate that classification behavior can appear to start simple,
yet adapt effectively to unexpected task structures. Two experiments — de-
signed using optimal experimental design principles — were conducted with
human learners. Classification decisions of the majority of participants were
best accounted for by a version of the model with very high initial prior
belief in class-conditional independence, before adapting to the true envi-
ronmental structure. Class-conditional independence may be a strong and
useful default assumption in category learning tasks.
Keywords: Classification; class-conditional independence; learning; Naïve
Bayes; Markov property; Bayesian model; probabilistic inference; heuristics
Categorization—grouping objects into classes and identifying class membership—is a
fundamental cognitive ability. From a computational perspective, category learning poses
formidable challenges, yet humans excel at it. Cognitive science has investigated how hu-
mans induce category structures, which representations they acquire, and which models
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account for learning and generalization. A number of studies have asked whether people
transition between different strategies during categorization learning (Bourne, Healy, Kole,
& Graham, 2006; Briscoe & Feldman, 2011; Goodman, Tenenbaum, Feldman, & Griffiths,
2008; Johansen & Palmeri, 2002; Medin & Smith, 1981; J. D. Smith & Minda, 1998). Al-
though there is controversy about which model best describes early learning (e.g., Bourne
et al., 2006; Johansen & Palmeri, 2002; J. D. Smith & Minda, 1998), one insight from
this work is that people start with simple strategies before progressing to more computa-
tionally intense strategies. Johansen and Palmeri (2002) found that people initially apply
uni-dimensional categorization rules (i.e., make classification decisions based on a single
feature) and adopt more complex rules (i.e., a similarity-based strategy using multiple fea-
tures) only if necessary. J. D. Smith and Minda (1998) observed that early in learning people
tended to use a simple prototype-based strategy and only later shifted to a computationally
more demanding exemplar-based strategy (but see Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002, for an alter-
native interpretation). These findings suggest that people transition from computationally
simple to more complex strategies.
One benefit of starting simple is computational efficiency. As long as the initial simple
rule gives good enough performance, a computationally more intense strategy need not be
invoked. The performance of strategies also depends on the environmental structure (e.g.,
linearly vs. nonlinearly separable environments; Blair & Homa, 2001; Medin & Schwa-
nenflugel, 1981). The environmental structure, however, is unknown at the beginning of
learning. One important question for a simple strategy is whether it performs robustly
across different environments. How can a strategy appear simple, and yet also be robust,
and perform well in situations with unexpected environmental structures? Robust perfor-
mance is especially important if the potential task structures are numerous and complex.
A Computational Perspective on Classification
At the computational level, classification implies several challenges. One such chal-
lenge consists in the curse of dimensionality (Bellmann, 1961): As the number of features
and categories in the environment grows, the number of feature–category combinations in-
creases exponentially. This holds even in the simple case of just two categories and binary
features: the number of possible feature-category combinations grows from 23 = 8 with two
features to 25 = 32 with four features to 29 = 512 with eight features. The curse of di-
mensionality is particularly important in real-world situations where the number of features
that could be considered is large. Yet human performance, for example in classification of
images consisting of many continuously valued features, has outperformed computer algo-
rithms (Russakovsky et al., 2015) until recently (He, Zhang, Ren, & Sun, 2015).
Another challenge, especially early in learning, is to make inferences from limited data.
In many real-world situations people will not have observed all possible feature–category
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combinations, necessitating inferences about novel instances from limited information. Yet
humans seem able to readily classify even previously unseen objects, such as galaxies (Lintott
et al., 2008).
Scope and Goals
The present study investigates one way to address the computational challenge of
probabilistic classification: the statistical principle of class-conditional independence. Ma-
chine learning research shows that this principle is simple and robust (Domingos & Pazzani,
1997). We introduce a probabilistic category learning model, the Dependence/Independence
Structure and Category-Learning Model (DISC-LM), that can incorporate any level of prior
belief in class-conditional independence. We designed two experiments in which the pre-
sumption of class-conditional independence would lead to specific error patterns. Results
show that a model with a high prior beliefs in class-conditional independence describes
human data best.
Our work complements prior research in a number of ways. We build on recent
demonstrations of inter-individual differences in category learning (Bartlema, Lee, Wetzels,
& Vanpaemel, 2014; McDaniel, Cahill, Robbins, & Wiener, 2014), by using a learning
paradigm that terminates based on individual performance (like e.g., Homa, Dunbar, &
Nohre, 1991; Medin & Smith, 1981), and model individual subjects’ learning and beliefs.
One limitation of previous studies that argued for shifts from simple to complex classification
strategies is a focus on large, discrete bins of learning trials (56 in J. D. Smith and Minda,
1998; 36 in Johansen and Palmeri, 2002), or on specific test trials interspersed during
learning (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Nosofsky, Kruschke, & Mckinley, 1992; Nosofsky,
Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994; J. D. Smith & Minda, 2002). By contrast, our design enabled
us to model each trial, and to present all exemplars, throughout the full learning duration.
Using optimal experimental design principles (Myung & Pitt, 2009; Nelson, 2005) enabled
us to find a task such that learners who presume class-conditional independence will make
strongly different classification decisions from learners who do not presume class-conditional
independence.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the descriptive validity of the statistical
principle of class-conditional independence in human classification learning. Our goal is to
investigate whether human category learning is guided by general default assumptions about
the structure of probabilistic environments, rather than testing a particular classification
model.
Class-conditional Independence
Classification, from a probabilistic modeling perspective, requires estimating the prob-
ability that a stimulus s belongs to class c, which can be computed using Bayes’s rule:
P (c | s) = P (s | c) P (c)
P (s) , (1)
where P (s | c) is known as the stimulus likelihood, the likelihood of a feature configuration
s given the class c; and P (c) denotes the class base rate, the probability of the class. The
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denominator P (s) is a normalizing constant given by ∑i P (s | ci) ∗ P (ci). Intuitively, the
probability that a stimulus belongs to class c is directly proportional to the class frequency,
and how often the stimulus has co-occurred with this class.1
Class-conditional feature independence means statistical independence of the features
given the true class (e.g., Domingos & Pazzani, 1997; Flach & Lachiche, 2004; Rish, Heller-
stein, & Thathachar, 2001). In general, statistical independence entails that joint proba-
bilities can be computed as the product of marginal probabilities. Class-conditional inde-
pendence means that if the class is known, knowing one feature does not give additional
ability to predict another feature. In other words, conditioning on the true class renders
features independent, whereas they are unconditionally dependent. If class-conditional fea-
ture independence holds, the stimulus likelihoods P (s | c) in Equation 1 can be computed
as
P (s | c) =
D∏
d=1
P (fd | c), (2)
where s denotes the stimulus (the feature configuration), c the class, fd the dth feature
of this stimulus, and D the total number of features. Class-conditional independence also
relates to idea of channel separability in sensory perception (Movellan & McClelland, 2001).
Benefits of Assuming Class-conditional Independence
One key advantage of assuming that features are independent given the true class con-
sists in addressing the curse of dimensionality (the exponential growth of feature-category
combinations with the number of features). Class-conditional independence strongly re-
duces the number of parameters a probabilistic model requires, compared to a model that
allows for arbitrary feature dependencies (see Fig. 1). Probabilistic models need to estimate
the stimulus likelihoods P (s | c) and the class base rates P (c) for Equation 1. While the
number of parameters for the class base rate is unaffected by the number of features, the
number of stimulus likelihoods grows exponentially in the number of features.2 The total
number of parameters a probabilistic model requires for a binary classification with D bi-
nary features is 2D+1−1, if the model allows for arbitrary feature dependencies.3 Assuming
class-conditional independence reduces the total number of necessary parameters to only
2D + 1.
1More precisely, classification requires estimating the probability that a given stimulus sj belongs to the
ith class ci: P (C = ci|S = sj) = P (S=sj |C=ci)P (C=ci)P (S=sj) where C ∈ {c1, . . . , cn} denotes the class random
variable, and S ∈ {s1, . . . , sm} the stimulus random variable. Each stimulus sj represents one possible
feature configuration. In the text, we omit the capital letters for random variables and most subscripts, to
increase readability.
2To illustrate, consider a stimulus with binary feature values. How many possible stimuli (feature con-
figurations) exist if there are two, three, or four features? Two features yield 22 = 4 stimuli, three features
yield 23 = 8 stimuli, four features yield 24 = 16 stimuli, and so forth.
3Generally (beyond binary classes and features), for a class vector c and D features, the number of
parameters is (
∏D
d=1|fd| − 1) · |c|, where |c| denotes the number different classes, D is the number of
different features, and |fd| the number of values the dth feature can take. By contrast, if class-conditional
independence holds, the number of parameters is
∑D
d=1(|fd| − 1)·|c|.
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Figure 1 . Growth of the number of parameters in a binary categorization task as the number
of features increases: (a) probabilistic model allowing for flexible feature dependencies;
(b) probabilistic model relying on class-conditional feature independence.
A second computational benefit of class-conditional independence is that it allows
inferences about new feature configurations, beyond inferences based on the category base
rates alone. Even if a feature configuration has not been observed yet, the individual features
may have occurred. If two exemplars, "ab" and "cd," and the class of each exemplar, have
been observed, class-conditional independence enables inferences about the unseen feature
configuration "ad" by using the marginal feature likelihoods of feature "a" and "d" to compute
the configural likelihood of "ad" via Equation 2.
Another advantage of class-conditional independence is its robustness. Although
class-conditional independence may not hold exactly in many real-world environments (Rish
et al., 2001; Titterington et al., 1981), presuming class-conditional independence need not
impair classification performance. Both simulation studies and analytic results demonstrate
the robustness of the naïve Bayes classifier, which treats features as class-conditionally in-
dependent. It often classifies accurately even if features are correlated given the true class
(Domingos & Pazzani, 1997; Rish et al., 2001).
In sum, assuming that features are independent given the class has several com-
putational benefits. From a psychological perspective, treating the environment as class-
conditionally independent is a bet that the task structure complies with it. Acting accord-
ingly can be useful due to its computational efficiency and robustness. However, dogmat-
ically adhering to class-conditional independence in the face of substantial contradictory
evidence would be a bad idea, because some category structures would be unlearnable.
For instance, the naïve Bayes algorithm cannot learn the exclusive-OR problems that have
been extensively studied in machine learning (Minsky & Papert, 1969), human categoriza-
tion (Little & Lewandowsky, 2009; Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004), and causal learning
(Waldmann & Martignon, 1998; Walsh & Sloman, 2008).4 Humans can learn exclusive-OR
4For instance, if coffee is "expensive" if it is either from Brazil or lightly roasted, but not when it is from
Brazil and lightly roasted and also not when it is neither from Brazil nor lightly roasted, this class structure
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problems (e.g., Little & Lewandowsky, 2009) and with sufficient experience can learn infer-
ences based on configural stimuli rather than marginal features (e.g., Johansen & Palmeri,
2002; Little & Lewandowsky, 2009; Nosofsky & Bergert, 2007). Therefore, our hypothesis
is not that learners always assume class-conditional independence, no matter what they
have experienced. Rather, the idea is that learners use this principle as a default assump-
tion in novel classification tasks. We introduce a new Bayesian model, the DISC-LM, that
formalizes the idea of placing a particular level of prior belief in class-conditional indepen-
dence, and illustrates what kind of evidence is needed to learn if that belief is incorrect in
a particular task environment.
Class-Conditional Independence and Other Classification Models
We next outline how class-conditional independence relates to single feature rules,
decision bounds, prototype models, and fast-and-frugal trees, all of which also address
the curse of dimensionality. Several of these psychological models are also hypothesized to
describe human behavior early in category learning (Johansen & Palmeri, 2002; J. D. Smith
& Minda, 1998), but none explicitly presumes class-conditional feature independence.
Single feature rules, which classify using one feature only, can sometimes describe
human categorization behavior (e.g., Pothos & Close, 2008). Accordingly, people attend to
just one feature. In terms of computational complexity, single feature rules are another way
to greatly simplify the classification task, ignoring the curse of dimensionality altogether.
While single feature rules need to attend to one feature and can ignore all remaining features,
class-conditional independence attends to all features given the class but ignores any feature
interactions given the class. The latter imposes an assumption about feature relations rather
than attention restrictions.
Decision bound models are closely related to class-conditional independence. Decision
bound models estimate a parametric boundary between categories. They often implement
a linear bound without feature interactions, which is another way to address the curse
of dimensionality (but other functional forms are possible). Linear feature separability
is related to class-conditional feature independence, because in log space the naïve Bayes
classifier is an interaction-free additive model (Manning, Raghavan, & Schutze, 2009; Zhang
& Ling, 2001), that is, it induces a log-linear decision bound. For binary features, class-
conditional independence implies linear separability of features, although this does not in
general hold for features with more than two values (Zhang & Ling, 2001).
Additive prototype models compare the current stimulus to the most typical previous
stimulus from each category (e.g., Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972) and select the class
whose prototype is most similar to the current exemplar. Since there is only one proto-
type per category, the number of comparisons between a novel stimulus and the prototypes
increases linearly with categories instead of exponentially with features, thereby also ad-
dressing the curse of dimensionality. The classification of prototype models, however, differs
from classification based on class-conditional independence, because the latter involves no
similarity-based comparison to previous exemplars.
Fast-and-frugal trees classify according to a pruned decision tree, considering features
is in line with exclusive-OR. More formally, an object belongs to class C = 1 if it has either feature f1 = 1
or feature f2 = 1, but not when both or neither of the two features are present.
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sequentially one by one (Luan, Schooler, & Gigerenzer, 2011; Martignon, Katsikopoulos, &
Woike, 2008). Popular fast-and-frugal tree construction methods (Martignon et al., 2008)
are based solely on the marginal relationship of the individual features to the classes, and
thus do not consider feature interactions. Depending on the tree structure and the stimulus
being classified, fast-and-frugal trees may be able to make classification decisions based only
on a subset of features, without considering all features of the stimulus.
Class-Conditional Independence in Psychological Models
Some probabilistic models explicitly presume class-conditional independence (e.g.,
Anderson, 1991; Barrington, Marks, Hsiao, & Cottrell, 2008; Friedman, Massaro, Kitzis,
& Cohen, 1995; Shafto, Kemp, Mansinghka, & Tenenbaum, 2011), but the idea that peo-
ple begin learning with a particular feature-dependency assumption is at most indirectly
addressed in these models.
Conditional independence assumptions have been investigated more directly in re-
search on causal reasoning. This literature has focused on inference patterns entailed by
the causal Markov condition (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines, 1993), which is
closely related to class-conditional independence.5 Results indicate that reasoners often tend
to violate the Markov condition (e.g., Rehder, 2014; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005; Rottman &
Hastie, 2016), but also that they are sensitive to relevant contextual information (Mayrhofer
& Waldmann, 2014) and considerations about the underlying causal mechanisms (Park &
Sloman, 2013; Walsh & Sloman, 2008).
Whereas there has been considerable research on conditional independence assump-
tions in causal reasoning, little research has specifically investigated this issue in proba-
bilistic categorization. To directly test whether class-conditional independence is a default
presumption in probabilistic classification learning, we pit a model that initially explicitly
assumes class-conditional independence against one without this prior assumption, and al-
low the model to learn the dependency structure from experience. Empirically, we use an
experience-based learning paradigm (rather than conveying information numerically or ver-
bally) to track how people’s experience with a new environment shapes their classification
behavior over the course of learning. Our methodology also enables us to study people’s
internal beliefs via their behavior, rather than via people’s responses to specific verbal or
numeric questions.
The Dependence/Independence Structure and Category-Learning Model
(DISC-LM)
To formalize the assumption of class-conditional independence, we developed a prob-
abilistic model that incorporates uncertainty about whether features are independent given
5The Markov condition states that a variable in a causal network is independent of all other variables, con-
ditional on its direct causes, except its causal descendants. The close relationship between class-conditional
independence and the Markov condition is best illustrated with a common-cause network. Consider a binary
cause C with three binary effects, E1, E2, and E3. Applying the causal Markov condition to this causal
structure entails that the three effects are independent of each other conditional on their common cause C.
Now, if C represents a binary class variable and E1, E2, and E3 represent three binary features, the assump-
tion of class-conditional independence is equivalent to the causal Markov condition. Thus, class-conditional
independence can be considered a special case of the Markov condition applied to a common-cause model.
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the class, and uncertainty about the feature likelihoods as well as uncertainty about the
class base rate. We designed this model to formalize the assumption of class-conditional
independence in learning, rather than as a competitor to the existing more sophisticated
classification models.
The DISC-LM is a hierarchical Bayesian model. It computes the probability that
a stimulus belongs to class 1 according to class-conditional feature independence, and ac-
cording to flexible conditional feature dependencies. The DISC-LM weights the obtained
posterior probabilities according to the match between the data and the structural assump-
tion about feature independence using Bayesian model averaging (Chickering & Heckerman,
1997). The resulting classification decision reflects both the uncertainty about whether fea-
tures are class-conditionally independent and the uncertainty within each structural model
about the true values of the class base rate and the stimulus likelihoods.We next describe
the DISC-LM conceptually. The formal details are outlined in the Supplementary Material
A.
Model Parameters
The DISC-LM has two parameters. The first parameter is the structural belief pa-
rameter pi with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1. It governs the model’s prior belief that the environment complies
with class-conditional independence. Higher values of pi lead to inferences more similar to
inferring the class assuming class-conditional feature independence. Different values of this
parameter can be used to model individual differences in believing that features are class-
conditionally independent. The second parameter is the conservatism parameter δ with
δ ≥ 1. It governs how much experience the model requires to learn the probabilities needed
for computing the class probabilities. Higher values of δ lead to more conservative learning.
The conservatism parameter enables the DISC-LM to account for individual differences in
learning speed.
The Model
The DISC-LM is a hierarchical Bayesian model with two levels (for an introduction
to Bayesian modeling see, e.g., Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 2008). At the lower level
it infers the class base rate and stimulus likelihoods.6 The class base rate P (c1) is inferred
by updating a Beta distribution with a symmetric prior with hyper parameters equal to
δ, resulting in a uniform prior for δ = 1 and a symmetric prior around 0.50 for δ > 1.
The stimulus likelihoods P (s | c1) and P (s | c2) are inferred twice. The first inference,
which formalizes the ability to learn arbitrary feature dependencies, uses two Dirichlet
distributions over the two times eight possible likelihoods, each with a symmetric prior with
hyper parameters equal to δ. The second inference, which formalizes the assumption of class-
conditional feature independence, estimates the marginal feature likelihoods P (fd | c1) and
P (fd | c2) based on which the configural stimulus likelihoods are computed (Equation 2).
6One alternative implementation (instead of the two-part inference of base rate and stimulus likelihoods)
would be a direct inference of the probabilities of the eight stimuli given the class. This direct inference,
however, is not suitable for implementing class-conditional feature independence which enters only through
the stimulus likelihoods.
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The marginal feature likelihoods are inferred by updating two times three independent Beta
distributions, each of which has a symmetric prior with hyper parameters equal to δ.
Given the inferred class base rate and the stimulus likelihoods the model computes
the class of stimulus s (Equation 1) once based on the Dirichlet stimulus likelihood — which
can capture any feature dependencies — and once based on the Beta feature likelihoods,
assuming class-conditional independence. We denote these estimates as Pˆ (c | s; flex), and
Pˆ (c | s; cci), respectively.
At the higher level the DISC-LM infers the degree to which features are class-
conditionally independent in the environment. Given the observed data the DISC-LM
computes a posterior structural belief in class-conditional independence, pˆi. This posterior
structural belief equals the normalized likelihood of the observed data under the assump-
tion of class-conditional independence, weighted by a prior probability of class-conditional
independence equal to pi. Depending on whether the environment obeys class-conditional
independence or not, the posterior structural belief pˆi shifts toward 1 or 0, over the course
of learning.
If the prior structural belief pi = 0 the model classifies only based on allowing for
flexible class-conditional feature dependencies, whereas if pi = 1 the model classifies only
based on class-conditional feature independence. For both pi = 0 and pi = 1 the posterior
structural belief pˆi equals the prior structural belief pi throughout learning. For beliefs of
0 < pi < 1 the model classifies based on a mixture of the estimates with and without
class-conditional independence.
The DISC-LM then predicts the probability that the next stimulus s belongs to class
c as
Pˆ (c | s) = pˆi Pˆ (c | s; cci) + (1− pˆi) Pˆ (c | s; flex), (3)
where flex and cci denote whether the current estimates were generated assuming flexible
feature dependencies or class-conditional feature independence, respectively; and pˆi is the
posterior structural belief in class-conditional independence.
A key feature of the DISC-LM is that for a high prior belief in class-conditional
independence it behaves as if this property holds in the environment; however, enough
learning experience can override an erroneous prior belief for prior belief values below 1.
Relation to Other Mixture Models of Classification
We briefly consider how the DISC-LM relates to three other mixture models. The
prototype-exemplar mixture model by Medin, Altom, and Murphy (1984) formalizes classifi-
cation as a mixture between a multiplicative prototype model (Reed, 1972) and an exemplar
model (Medin & Schaffer, 1978) with a mixing proportion e. It differs from the DISC-LM
with respect to the classification models it combines. Further, the mixing proportion in the
prototype-exemplar model is constant, whereas the DISC-LM updates its mixing parameter
(the level of belief in class-conditional independence) dynamically.
Gaussian mixture models, which have been used as a general framework for classifica-
tion (Rosseel, 2002), represent the probability density of the stimuli by a sum of multivariate
Gaussian distributions. Each distribution is defined by a mean feature value and a feature
co-variance matrix. The features can, but need not be, independent; they are indepen-
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dent only if the co-variance matrix is diagonal (Monti & Cooper, 1999). Further, in such
mixture models, independence is conditioned on a hidden mixture component, rather than
(as in the case of class conditional independence) on the true class. For class-conditional
independence, the probability density of the stimulus likelihood is a product of marginal
(univariate) densities. If the marginal feature likelihood densities are Gaussian, the DISC-
LM density can be represented by a Gaussian mixture model with a diagonal co-variance
matrix.
The hierarchical dirichlet process (HDP) model by Griffiths, Canini, Sanborn, and
Navarro (2007) learns to group exemplars into a number of unknown clusters that need
not correspond to the factual categories; this enables the model to form prototypes across
categories (a similar idea is implemented by Vanpaemel & Storms, 2008). Its objective
is to learn how many clusters are needed. The HDP model differs from the DISC-LM
in two ways: While the HDP model infers the clusters, the DISC-LM conditions on the
true categories without inferring hidden clusters. Further, while the HDP model assumes
that features are conditionally independent given the current clusters, the DISC-LM learns
dynamically whether features are independent given the true class.
Summary
A new Bayesian learning model, the DISC-LM, learns whether the environmental
structure corresponds to class-conditional independence and the necessary parameters for
making classification decisions. If the prior structural belief parameter pi = 1, the model
incorporates the assumption of class-conditional independence. Setting the structural belief
parameter to pi = 0 makes feature dependencies completely flexible. The DISC-LM with a
structural belief parameter 0 < pi < 1 weights the two posterior class probabilities by the
fit between the observed data and the posterior belief pˆi about whether class-conditional
independence holds.
Design: Statistical Task Environment
We designed a classification task to strongly differentiate the behavior of learners
who do and do not assume class-conditional independence, respectively. Our task had three
binary features and a binary class.
Optimal Experimental Design
We searched for a statistical task structure in which class-conditional independence
fails, despite its usual robust performance across different task structures. We used optimal
experimental design principles (Myung & Pitt, 2009; Nelson, 2005), i.e. computationally
optimizing the task’s parameters to discriminates between models. A genetic numeric op-
timization algorithm with hill-climbing was employed to search the space of possible task
parameters for a solution that maximized the disagreement between classifications based
on class-conditional independence and the true environmental structure. Supplementary
Material B describes the procedure.
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pendence and example classifications by various classification models.
Environment 1: Deterministic Task
The resulting optimized task environment contains five stimuli, denoted as 000, 001,
010, 100, 111; three of the eight possible stimuli do not occur (110, 101, 011). This was a
result of the optimization, not a deliberate choice on our part. Fig. 2a illustrates the true
classification task. Assuming class-conditional independence would lead to the erroneous
classifications shown in Fig. 2b. This task structure allows us to test whether people assume
class-conditional independence, because it implies strongly divergent classification decisions
depending on whether class-conditional independence is assumed or not.
Table 1 summarizes the statistics of Environment 1. It shows the stimuli, their fre-
quencies, the true probability with which they belong to class 1, and the class probability
derived assuming class-conditional independence. For four of the five stimuli the clas-
sification decision based on class-conditional independence conflicts with the actual class
membership (indicated by 6=). We refer to those items as critical stimuli. Fig. 3 summarizes
all parameters that describe the task.
The environment entails that a probabilistic model that assumes class-conditional
independence selects a different class from that chosen by a probabilistic model that knows
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Table 1
Environment 1 (Deterministic Task)
Stimulus s P (s) P (c1 | s)
Flexible Flexible Class-conditional
dependencies dependencies independence
1 1 1 .39 1 ≈ .91
1 0 0 .11 0 6= .58
0 1 0 .11 0 6= .58
0 0 1 .11 0 6= .58
0 0 0 .28 1 6= .33
Note: P (s) : occurrence probability of stimulus s; Flexible dependencies: true class
probability assuming class-conditional feature dependencies; Class-conditional in-
dependence: class probabilities derived assuming class-conditional independence;
6=: class-conditional independence yields different class decisions than the true
environment.
the true stimulus likelihoods. Both methods select the same class for only one of the
five stimuli: stimulus 111 belongs to class 1 with probability 1 in the actual environment;
presuming class conditional independence, it belongs to class 1 with probability .91. Thus,
both models select class 1 given stimulus 111.
This equivalence in model decisions does not hold for the four critical stimuli. In the
actual environment, stimulus 000 belongs to class 1 with probability 1, but under class-
conditional independence it would belong to class 2 with probability .67. Similarly, the
other critical stimuli (100, 010, 001) actually belong to class 2, but a learner assuming
class-conditional independence would assign them to class 1, because P (c1 | s; cci) = .58.
The model disagreement is strongest for stimulus 000, with P (c1 | 000; true env) = 1.00
but P (c1 | 000; cci) = .33. Note that the stimuli are not equally frequent. The uncritical
stimulus 111 is most frequent.
A model treating features as class-conditionally independent will perform poorly in
this environment, irrespective of the amount of learning data. The poor performance fol-
lows from falsely assuming that features are class-conditionally independent, a structural
assumption embedded in the inference mechanism. A learner who fully believes in class-
conditional independence at the outset of learning cannot learn the true structure of this
environment, and would keep this incorrect structural belief, even after infinite experience.
Performance of Single Feature, Decision Bound, Prototype, and Fast and
Frugal Tree models in our Task. Let us return to the four simple psychological clas-
sification models outlined in the introduction, and compare their class predictions in our
task environment to the predictions made by assuming class-conditional independence.
A classifier that uses only a single feature dimension cannot learn the task. One
such classifier is shown in Fig. 2c. It is easy to see that no two-dimensional plane which
is parallel to the axis separates the feature combinations into the true classes. A linear
classification rule without interaction terms (Ashby & Townsend, 1986) fails as well. One
such example is shown in Fig. 2d; it is easy to see that no single two-dimensional plane sorts
the feature combinations into the true classes. Nor can an additive prototype model with
mean feature values used for prototypes (e.g. Reed, 1972) learn the task (Fig. 2e). Additive
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Table 2
Environment 2 (Probabilistic Task)
Stimulus s P (s) P (c1 | s)
Flexible Flexible Class-conditional
dependencies dependencies independence
1 1 1 .38 .95 ≈ .89
1 0 0 .11 .25 6= .65
0 1 0 .11 .25 6= .65
0 0 1 .11 .25 6= .65
0 0 0 .29 .94 6= .48
Note: P (s) : occurrence probability of stimulus s; Flexible dependencies: true class
probability assuming class-conditional feature dependencies; Class-conditional in-
dependence: class probabilities derived assuming class-conditional independence;
6=: class-conditional independence yields different class decisions than the true
environment.
prototype models compute a representative (average) member of each class and compare
how far away each feature combination is from this prototype. Fast and Frugal trees reach
between 39 % and 61% classification accuracy if constructed by the max(val+,val−) and
zigzag(val+,val−) tree construction methods (Martignon, Vitouch, Takezawa, & Forster,
2003), respectively, while in our task 100 % accuracy is achievable.
Considering single feature, decision bound, and prototype classifiers we see that only
the linear decision bound arrives at the same classifications as the class-conditional indepen-
dence assumption (Fig. 2d). Single feature rules (Fig. 2c) and the additive prototype model
(Fig. 2e) yield classifications that differ from the ones induced by assuming class-conditional
independence. Importantly, none of these classifiers can learn the task environment.
Environment 2: Probabilistic Task
An interesting property of the optimized task environment is the deterministic class
membership: All stimuli belong to a class with P = 1 or P = 0. Our optimization did
not explicitly aim for this, but — from a mathematical perspective — deterministic class
membership best differentiates whether a classifier presumes class-conditional independence
given three-binary features and a binary class. However, we do not want to limit our
analyses and empirical results to deterministic environments, which we suspect are fairly
rare, especially in situations with limited knowledge. Furthermore, research comparing
learning in deterministic and probabilistic tasks (e.g., Little & Lewandowsky, 2009; Mehta
& Williams, 2002) found that participants needed longer to learn probabilistic category
structures (but see Seger & Cincotta, 2005). We therefore designed a second, probabilistic
environment.
We manually changed the parameters of Environment 1 to design a probabilistic
analogue of it (Table 2). Environment 2 includes the same five stimuli, occurring with fre-
quencies almost identical to Environment 1. The class probabilities, however, are no longer
certain. For instance, in Environment 2, stimulus 010 belongs to class 2 with probability
.75, rather than probability 1 in Environment 1. Importantly, Environment 2 preserves the
same critical and uncritical stimuli.
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Flexible
dependencies
Class-conditional
independence
Class
base rates
Configural stimulus
likelihoods
Marginal feature
likelihoods
ܲ(ܿଵ)  =  .67
ܲ 000 ܿଵ)  =  .42
ܲ(001 |ܿଵ)  =  0
ܲ 010 ܿଵ)  =  0
ܲ(011 |ܿଵ)  =  0
ܲ(100 |ܿଵ)  =  0
ܲ(101 |ܿଵ)  =  0
ܲ 110 ܿଵ  =  0
ܲ 111 ܿଵ  = .58
ܲ(1__ |ܿଵ)  =  .58
ܲ(_1_ |ܿଵ)  =  .58
ܲ(__1 |ܿଵ)  =  .58
ܲ ܿଶ
= 1 − ܲ ܿଵ
=  .33
ܲ(000 |ܿଶ)  =  0
ܲ(001 |ܿଶ)  =  .33
ܲ(010 |ܿଶ)  =  .33
ܲ(011 |ܿଶ)  =  0
ܲ(100 |ܿଶ)  =  .33
ܲ(101 |ܿଶ)  =  0
ܲ 110 ܿଶ  =  0
ܲ 111 ܿଶ  =  0
ܲ(1__ |ܿଶ)  =  .33
ܲ(_1_ |ܿଶ)  =  .33
ܲ(__1 |ܿଶ)  =  .33
Flexible
dependencies
Class-conditional
independence
Class
base rates
Configural stimulus
likelihoods
Marginal feature
likelihoods
ܲ(ܿଵ)  =  .71
ܲ(000 |ܿଵ)  =  .38
ܲ(001 |ܿଵ)  =  .04
ܲ(010 |ܿଵ)  =  .04
ܲ(011 |ܿଵ)  =  0
ܲ(100 |ܿଵ)  =  .04
ܲ(101 |ܿଵ)  =  0
ܲ(110 |ܿଵ)  =  0
ܲ 111 ܿଵ  =   .50
ܲ(1__ |ܿଵ)  =  .54
ܲ(_1_ |ܿଵ)  =  .54
ܲ(__1 |ܿଵ)  =  .54
ܲ ܿଶ
= 1 − ܲ ܿଵ
=  .29
ܲ(000 |ܿଶ)  =  .06
ܲ(001 |ܿଶ)  =  .29
ܲ(010 |ܿଶ)  =  .29
ܲ(011 |ܿଶ)  =  0
ܲ(100 |ܿଶ)  =  .29
ܲ(101 |ܿଶ)  =  0
ܲ 110 ܿଶ  =  0
ܲ 111 ܿଶ  =  .07
ܲ(1__ |ܿଶ)  =  .36
ܲ(_1_ |ܿଶ)  =  .36
ܲ(__1 |ܿଶ)  =  .36
Environment 1 Environment 2
Figure 3 . Assuming class-conditional feature independence reduces the number of class-
conditional stimulus probabilities that are needed to describe the environment. The figure
shows two ways to describe the classification task, with and without the assumption of
class-conditional independence. The class base rate is required in either case. The Flexible
dependencies column shows that eight likelihoods (or class-conditional stimulus probabil-
ities) describe the environments. The Class-conditional independence column shows that
only three marginal likelihoods are required under the assumption of class-conditional in-
dependence. The environment in the left panel is deterministic, the one in the right panel
probabilistic. Note. P (c1) = class 1 base rate, P (000 | c1) = probability of configural
stimulus 000 given class 1, P (1__ | c1) = probability of first marginal stimulus dimension
given class 1.
Fig. 3 displays a comparison of the parameters required to specify our environments
depending on whether class-conditional independence is assumed or not. The comparison
shows that the number of parameters is smaller when assuming class-conditional indepen-
dence: Only three marginal feature likelihoods for each class are required; in total, seven
probabilities need to be estimated from data. Without the assumption of class-conditional
independence, seven configural stimulus likelihoods for each class need to be estimated (the
eighth stimulus likelihood is implied because the likelihoods given one class sum to 1); in
total, 15 probability estimates are required.
In our experiments and simulations we embedded the statistical task environments in
a trial-by-trial category learning task. Models and human learners were presented with one
stimulus, randomly drawn from the task distribution, and they received feedback about the
true class after their classification decision.
Simulation Studies
Our simulation studies investigated how the DICL-LM’s prior structural belief in
class-conditional independence, pi, influences model behavior in our two learning environ-
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ments, over the the time course of learning. We simulated the DISC-LM for N = 200
learners with 50 learning trials each for both the deterministic and the probabilistic task.
Method and Parameters
We simulated the posterior probability of the class for each trial and the posterior
structural belief according to the DISC-LM, using Monte Carlo simulation. We binarized
the posterior point estimates by an arg max response rule:
class choice =

class 1 if Pˆ (c1 | s) > .5
class 2 if Pˆ (c1 | s) < .5
random otherwise
(4)
where c1 is class 1 and s the stimulus.7
The DISC-LM was simulated with the conservatism parameter δ fixed at 1, and
with different values of the prior belief in class-conditional independence pi ∈ {0,
0.90, 0.99, 0.999999, 1}. Appendix A shows simulations for different values of δ. The uneven
grid for pi resulted from the fact that DISC-LM learners with values of pi < .7 converged to
behavior indistinguishable from learners with pi = 0 very quickly.
Results
We investigated how the prior belief in class-conditional independence influences
learning behavior (how fast can the model with different prior beliefs in class-conditional
independence learn?). We also investigated the development of the structural beliefs (how
quickly does the model learn that class-conditional independence is violated?). Fig. 4a
shows the results for Environment 1, and Fig. 4b shows the results for Environment 2.
Learning curves. The pi = 0 DISC-LM without structural belief in class-
conditional independence quickly learns to correctly classify all stimuli, in both environ-
ments. The maximum performance the model can achieve is lower in the probabilistic
(Fig. 4b) than in the deterministic environment (Fig. 4a). The variations in learning speed
of the pi = 0 model learner across the different stimuli reflect the unequal frequencies of the
7In modeling, there are three primary reasons for using the deterministic arg max choice rule. First, our
research focus is on comparing the model predictions with respect to the parameter pi, i.e., the initial belief
in class-conditional independence. A probabilistic choice rule could improve the absolute fit of the model but
leave the relative performance depending on pi unaffected. A logistic transformation of the class 1 probability,
such as a softmax response rule (Wills & Kruschke, 2008), shifts the posterior probabilities toward .50 but
does not shift them beyond this threshold, such as from .75 to .25. Remember that our task involves
four critical stimuli for which class-conditional independence predicts one class and flexible dependencies
predict the opposite class. We are interested exactly in whether the response switches from below .50 to
above .50. Therefore, a probabilistic response rule would add model complexity (adding another parameter)
without adding value to answer our question. Second, probabilistic choice rules require aggregating data over
individuals or trials (which is common practice, e.g., Friedman et al., 1995). Aggregating over trials assumes
little or no co-variance of choices over time (Hannan, 1985). However, learning data is characterized by time
dependencies. Therefore, time aggregation would not do justice to our data. Aggregating over individuals
is also not possible because people varied greatly in their learning speed (i.e., the number of trials they
needed to hit the learning criterion in our task). The third reason for the arg max rule is pragmatic. The
deterministic choice makes it easiest to illustrate how the parameter pi changes the DISC-LM’s performance.
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Figure 4 . (a) Deterministic environment, (b) Probabilistic environment. Mean accuracy:
How quickly the DISC-LM learns to classify the stimuli in Environment 1 depends on the
prior beliefs in class-conditional independence (CCI), pi. Stronger prior beliefs in class-
conditional independence result in slower learning, but only for the critical stimuli. Also
note that the leftmost model (pi = 0) performs above chance for stimuli 000 and 111 in
the first bin. This is because the DISC-LM with pi = 0 infers the class of stimuli 000 and
111 correctly from the class base rate within five trials. Belief in CCI: The belief in CCI
decreases with experience in the environment, for prior belief values of 0 < pi < 1 (higher
values represent stronger beliefs). Note: The x-axis shows the trials in bins of five while
keeping the presentation order of stimuli.
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stimuli (see Table 1, and Table 2). The model learns the more frequent stimuli 111 and 000
fastest, compared to 001, 010, and 100.
The pi = 1 DISC-LM with persistent structural belief in class-conditional feature
independence learns to correctly classify the uncritical stimulus 111 quickly in both envi-
ronments, but fails for the critical stimuli 100, 010, 001, 000. Even with infinite experience
this model will—in these particular environments—never learn, because the model’s per-
sisting structural belief prevents learning the true feature dependencies.
The DISC-LM with high, but non-deterministic, prior structural belief values (pi =
0.9, 0.99, 0.999999) learns the uncritical stimulus as quickly as the pi = 0DISC-LM. However,
high values of pi result in slower learning of the critical stimuli. The stronger the prior belief
in class-conditional independence, the slower the learning.
Learning the Feature Dependency Structure. The higher the prior structural
belief, the slower the DISC-LM learns that features are not class-conditionally independent.
Summary
With strong prior structural belief in class-conditional independence, learning of the
DISC-LM is influenced asymmetrically across feature combinations, in both environments.
With stronger prior structural beliefs, the critical stimuli 000, 100, 010, and 001 are learned
more slowly, but learning of stimulus 111 is not impaired. This is true in the determin-
istic and probabilistic environments alike. These simulation results are the basis of our
predictions for our experiment with human subjects, listed in Table 3.
Table 3
Predictions for the Stimuli in Our Task Based on the Simulation Study.
Simulation Result Description
Superiority of 111 Stimulus 111 is learned most quickly, largely indepen-
dent of the prior belief in class-conditional indepen-
dence pi
Initial slowing of 000 Learning of stimulus 000 is slower in the first trials the
stronger the prior belief in class-conditional indepen-
dence
Slowing of 001, 010, 100 Learning to classify stimuli is slowed down uniformly
with stronger prior beliefs in class-conditional indepen-
dence
Similarity of 000 and 111 The model with pi = 0 predicts that stimuli 000 and
111 are learned almost equally fast
Experiment 1 — Deterministic Task
Experiment 1 was designed to investigate the extent to which humans treat features as
class-conditionally independent early in learning. Our experiments used a supervised trial-
by-trial learning paradigm (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 1992) adapted from previous studies
(e.g., Meder & Nelson, 2012; Nelson, McKenzie, Cottrell, & Sejnowski, 2010). Experiment
1 was based on the deterministic task environment shown in Table 1.
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Figure 5 . Sample stimulus used in Experiments 1 and 2 (from Nelson, 2010). In each trial,
participants saw and classified one plankton specimen (left) on the basis of three binary
features. The gray boxes and magnification of the three features (right) are for illustrative
purposes only.
Participants
Thirty people (mean age 23.8 years, range 19 to 33 years, 67% female) participated;
remuneration was 12 euros. We recruited via the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cogni-
tion at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, Germany. Data were
collected from September to December 2012 at the center; the experiment was conducted
in accordance with the ethical and data protection guidelines there.
Materials and Procedure
Participants classified ’plankton’ stimuli differing in eye, claw, and tail appearance
(binary features) into species A and species B (class). Fig. 5 illustrates the material. Each
plankton specimen corresponded to one feature configuration in Table 1, but the assignment
of physical features and class labels was randomized across participants.
In the beginning participants were familiarized with the feature locations. In each
trial they classified a plankton specimen drawn from the probability distribution in Table 1,
and received feedback about the true class (letters "A" or "B") and a smile emoticon after
a correct decision or a frown emoticon otherwise. Learning was self-paced. Participants
were instructed to always choose the most likely class. The presentation of stimuli ended
when participants reached a learning criterion defined as both (a) having made at most four
classification errors over the last 200 trials (98% of 200 correct), and (b) having chosen the
most likely category for the last five times that each individual stimulus appeared within
the random sequence of stimuli.
After 15 learning trials participants saw "frequently asked questions," which, among
other things, reminded them to always pick the most likely class and informed them that it
usually takes 300−400 trials to reach criterion performance. At regular intervals (every 100
trials, from trial 200 onward), participants were informed about their current performance
and the maximum possible accuracy in the task. They were reminded to attend to all
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features rather than to focus on only one feature, but no information regarding how to
integrate features was given (see Appendix B).
Behavioral Results
All participants reached the learning criterion, in 200 to 798 trials (median = 338,
mean = 381, SD = 155).
Classification errors. The environmental probabilities were designed so that the
presumption of class-conditional independence would lead to incorrect classification of the
critical stimuli (000, 001, 010, 100). Accordingly, we expected more classification errors for
the critical stimuli than for the uncritical stimulus, overall. We derived error rates separately
for each stimulus, because stimuli were not equally frequent (see Table 1). As Fig. 6a shows,
participants misclassified the critical stimuli more frequently than the uncritical stimulus,
over the whole course of learning.8 This finding is consistent with the idea that people
treated features as class-conditionally independent and classified stimuli accordingly.
Aggregating errors over time and individuals, as in the above analysis, ignores inter-
personal variability and temporal dynamics (e.g., Estes & Maddox, 2005). The temporal
development of errors is key to our hypotheses. That all participants achieved criterion
performance indicates that they did not treat features as class-conditionally independent
throughout learning (otherwise they would have failed to reach criterion performance). Our
hypothesis, formalized in the DISC-LM, is an initial assumption of class-conditional inde-
pendence. This should slow down early learning, in particular. We next analyze individual
learning dynamics.
Learning curves. DISC-LM simulations showed that a high prior belief in class-
conditional independence impairs learning asymmetrically for the critical stimuli, but not
for stimulus 111 (Fig. 4). All versions of the DISC-LM predicted a superiority of stimulus
111, which the human data in Fig. 6b confirm. Importantly, the human data show slower
learning of 000 compared to 111. This was only predicted by the DISC-LM with high
prior beliefs in class-conditional independence; it contradicts behavior of the DISC-LM
without structural priors (pi = 0, according to which 000 and 111 should be learned equally
fast). Moreover, the DISC-LM with prior beliefs in class-conditional independence > .90
predicted that stimuli 001, 010, and 100 would suffer an initial phase of stagnation, before
being learned. Participants’ learning curves also show this pattern, supporting the idea that
learners initially treat features as class-conditionally independent.
Modeling Results
Data preprocessing. Because the DISC-LM assumes symmetric prior distribu-
tions, it predicts a mean class base rate in trial one of p(c1) ≈ p(c2) ≈ .50, except for small
Monte Carlo errors. We tested if participants’ first choices deviated from randomness and
found no difference (19 of 30 class a choices in the first trial, exact binomial test for equal
8This analysis used all trials, i.e., including the last 200 trials for which our learning criterion enforced
98% correct choices, because excluding the last 200 trials resulted in 19 (of 30) participants being left with
fewer than 20 learning trials for one or more of the five stimuli. If we compute the median of the proportion
of errors after excluding the last 200 trials, the qualitative result is unchanged, i.e., fewest errors for the
uncritical stimulus (111 < 000 ≈ 100 ≈ 010 ≈ 001 with median error rates .09, .22, .21, .22, .20 respectively).
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Figure 6 . Results of Experiment 1. (a) Mean error rates across all trials for each stimulus. Error bars =
standard errors, bootstrapped with 100 replications. Error rates were lowest for the uncritical stimulus (111)
and higher for the critical stimuli (000, 001, 010, 100). (b) Proportion of correct choices in the first 100
trials. Dots represent correct (i.e., most likely) classifications per stimulus, averaged within bins of width
10. The curves show that the uncritical stimulus (111) was learned faster than the critical stimuli. Among
the latter, learning stimulus 000 was easiest, but still harder than 111. (c) In the first 10 trials, a model
assuming class-conditional independence (pi = 1) fits the data better than a model without the assumption
(pi = 0) for most participants; this reverses for the last 10 trials. (d) Distribution of the prior structural
belief parameter pi when predicting individual choices of participants (N = 30). A value of pi = 0 means
flexible conditional feature dependencies; a value of 1 means a strong fixed prior belief in class-conditional
independence. Models with a high prior on class-conditional independence best account for the majority of
participants in Experiment 1. Note: Model fit was assessed by mean squared error (MSE, see main text). (e)
Joint distribution of the obtained parameter values. Squares show which parameter combinations occurred;
darker colors denote higher occurrence frequencies.
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proportions: p = .21). To ensure that the Monte Carlo error did not distort the compari-
son of model and human behavior, we predicted participants’ decisions only starting from
trial 2. Further, we used the observed decisions only up to T − 200, where T is a partic-
ipant’s last trial, because in the last 200 trials our learning criterion enforced 98% correct
choices. This excluded one participant who needed exactly 200 trials, for whom we assumed
no prior belief in class-conditional independence, i.e. pi = 0. This left 29 participants for
the subsequent analyses.
Prediction generation. To investigate at a more fine-grained level whether class-
conditional feature independence is a default assumption in human category learning, we
were particularly interested in the parameter pi of the DISC-LM (i.e., the prior belief in
class-conditional feature independence). We applied individual parameter selection through
one-trial-ahead prediction, using mean squared error (MSE) as the criterion for the quality
of the prediction.9 MSE was our measure of choice because it emerged as the best measure
in a parameter recovery simulation, compared to mean absolute error and likelihood-based
measures (see Supplementary Material C).
We modeled the decision of each learner in each trial with the DISC-LM. The clas-
sification probabilities were derived from Monte Carlo simulations using a grid of a priori
fixed parameter values. This grid included pi ∈ {0, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.99, 0.999999, 1}; and con-
servatism values of δ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 12, 20, 33, 55, 90, 148}.10
Goodness of fit. If participants begin with the assumption of class-conditional
independence, their early behavior but not their late behavior should be described better
by a model incorporating class-conditional independence, compared to a model without
such assumptions. We tested this using data from people’s first 10 and last 10 choices,
computing the difference in fit between a class-conditional independence DISC-LM (pi = 0)
and the flexible-dependency DISC-LM (pi = 1), given individually adjusted δ parameters.
Fig. 6c shows that the class-conditional-independence DISC-LM accounts better for the
early data (it fits 19 of 26 participants better, positive mean fit difference of 4 percentage
points, t(25) = 4.02, p = .0005), but it performs worse than the flexible independence DISC-
LM for the late data (it fits only 3 participants better, negative mean fit difference of −7
percentage points, t(25) = −3.40, p = .003).11
Model accuracy. We obtained the parameter combinations for pi and δ that jointly
minimized the MSE between observed choices and model predictions. Given the resulting
parameter combinations, the model’s accuracy was 81.77%, averaged across the 29 partici-
9For each participant, the individual MSE was computed as MSE = 1
T
∑
t
(xt − pˆt)2, where t indexes
trials, T is the number of trials used for parameter selection, xt denotes the participant’s choice for trial
t, and pˆt denotes the predicted probability for the class. This was the simulated expected value of the
classification beliefs for each trial (see Supplementary Material A for details).
10We used a finer grid resolution for pi close to 1 because the model predictions in the lower grid regions
were rather similar to each other, ceteris paribus. Each prediction by models with values of pi ≤ 0.6 differed
by less than 1 percentage point from predictions by a model with pi = 0, when comparing trials 2 to 100.
By contrast, changing pi from .9 to .99 resulted in a substantial difference in the predicted point estimates
of the class membership. We rounded the predictions to the fourth digit.
11The reduced number of degrees of freedom (df = 25 instead of 28 with 29 participants) result from the
fact that some people were excluded because they had less than 20 (i.e., 10 early, 10 late) learning trials.
Note that learning trials were the total trial number T − 200.
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pants.12 By contrast, a DISC-LM without independence assumptions that enforces flexible
dependencies (pi = 0 and best-fitting values of δ) is less accurate, reaching only 77.42%
accuracy, with a mean difference between those models of .04 (t(28) = 3.58, p = .0012).
Remember, one participant was not modeled because she hit the learning criterion in the
minimum of 200 trials. To not ignore her data, we added this person (without fitting the
model) as one not using class-conditional independence, with values of pi = 0 and δ = 1.
This was because our learning criterion enforced good performance for the last 200 trials
and by design, correct classification is only possible if any initial belief in class-conditional
independence is given up.
Initial beliefs in class-conditional independence. We hypothesized that hu-
mans start classification learning with an initial belief that features are class-conditionally
independent (high values of pi). The data strongly bear out this expectation. Of our 30
participants, 25 were best accounted for by a model with prior belief in class-conditional in-
dependence of at least .99 (Fig. 6e shows results for both the class-conditional independence
prior and the conservatism parameter), and 2 participants had moderately high values of
pi = .7. The joint distribution of prior belief and conservatism parameters in Fig. 6e shows
that only some of the participants with higher class-conditional independence priors are
more conservative. This suggests that class-conditional independence is assumed by the
majority of participants early in classification learning. Only 3 of 30 participants were best
accounted for by a model without prior belief in class-conditional independence (i.e., with
pi = 0).
Summary. Both the classification errors for the different stimuli on the aggre-
gate level, and individual participants’ behavior, are consistent with the idea that class-
conditional independence serves as a default assumption in classification learning. The
classification errors and different learning curves are in line with a model that assumes
a strong initial belief in conditional independence. When fitting the pi parameter of the
DISC-LM to the learning data, for most participants a high value of pi accounted for the
data best. We next investigated a probabilistic task.
Experiment 2 — Probabilistic Task
Participants
A total of 39 people participated. Ten had to be excluded (8 who did not reach the
learning criterion in 120 min, 2 due to a computer crash), leaving us with 29 participants
(mean age 24.8 years, range 18 to 35 years; 79% female). They were paid 12 euros. Data
were gathered from April to June 2013 at the same laboratory as in Experiment 1.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were almost identical to Experiment 1, with the differ-
ence that the stimuli were drawn from the probabilistic task environment (Table 2). The
correct (most likely) choices given the stimuli corresponded to Experiment 1, but the max-
imum achievable accuracy was 88% (instead of 100% as in Experiment 1). Learning ended
12Accuracy was defined as the number of trials in which observations corresponded to the model predictions
after binarizing the probabilistic predictions by an argmax response rule (Equation 4).
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when participants selected the most likely class 98 % out of the last 200 trials and had
selected the most likely class for the last five appearances of each stimulus.
Behavioral Results
The participants who reached the learning criterion needed between 212 to 1156 trials
(median = 627, mean = 620, SD = 280) to achieve criterion performance, which is more
than Experiment 1 (t(43) = 4.03, p = .0003, Cohen’s d = 1.06, with Welch–Satterthwaite
correction for variance inhomogeneity). The slower learning in the probabilistic compared
to the deterministic environment corresponds to previous findings (Little & Lewandowsky,
2009; Mehta & Williams, 2002; Nosofsky & Stanton, 2005); with exceptions (Juslin, Olsson,
& Olsson, 2003; Seger & Cincotta, 2005).
Classification errors. As in Experiment 1, we computed the proportion of errors
separately for each stimulus, aggregating over time and participants (errors were defined as
not choosing the most likely class). Again participants made more errors when classifying
the critical stimuli, for which assuming class-conditional independence results in diverging
class choices than when assuming flexible dependencies, compared to the uncritical stimulus
(Fig. 7a)13. The relatively small number of errors for the critical stimulus 000 can be
explained considering Table 2, which shows that, in this environment, a classifier with class-
conditional independence predicts the correct class of 000 with a rather high probability,
P (c1 | 000; cci) = .48.
Learning curves. Fig. 7b shows the stimulus-wise learning curves, aggregated over
participants. The pattern corroborates the results of Experiment 1: The easiest item was
the uncritical stimulus 111; the critical stimulus 000 was more difficult, at least in the
beginning. This pattern is predicted only by the DISC-LM learners with beliefs in class-
conditional independence, and not by a model that a priori assumes flexible conditional
feature dependencies (pi = 0). Critical stimuli 001, 010, and 001 were the most difficult,
consistent with strong beliefs in class-conditional independence. Again, the data are at
variance with the pattern predicted by the DISC-LM with pi = 0, according to which stimuli
000 and 111 should be learned equally quickly. These findings are in line with the results
of Experiment 1, supporting the hypothesis that human learners initially treat features as
class-conditionally independent.
Modeling Results
We used all trials except the first trial and the final 200 trials to examine which values
of the prior belief in class-conditional feature independence pi best predicted participants’
decisions. We tested whether we excluded informative data by not using the first trial and
found no evidence for this: 12 of 29 participants selected class 1 in the first trial, exact
binomial test for equal proportions: p = .46. We derived predictions using Monte Carlo
simulations of the DISC-LM for different values of pi and δ. The parameter grids consisted of
pi ∈ {0, 0.8, 0.9, 0.99, 0.999999, 1}, and δ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 12, 20, 33, 55, 90, 148}. The grid was
13Again, our analysis used all trials, i.e., including the last 200 trials for which our learning criterion
enforced 98% correct choices, because excluding the last 200 trials resulted in 9 (of 29) participants with fewer
than 20 choices for at least one stimulus type. When excluding the last 200 trials, the order of the median
error rates corresponds to using all trials: The order is 111 < 000 < 100 < 010 ≈ 001 (.09, .15, .33, .37, .39
respectively).
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Figure 7 . Results of Experiment 2. (a) Classification errors. (b) Classification improve-
ment in the first 100 trials. Dots represent most-likely-class choices per stimulus, averaged
within bins of width 10. The curves show that participants improved fastest for the uncrit-
ical stimulus (111). For critical stimuli, improvement was slower. Among them, learning
stimulus 000 was easiest, but still harder than 111. (c) In the first 10 trials, a model as-
suming class-conditional independence (pi = 1) shows a higher fit than a model without
the assumption (pi = 0) for most participants; however, this reverses for the last 10 trials.
(d) Distribution of best predicting values for the parameter pi (N = 29). This parameter
reflects the model’s prior belief in a class-conditionally independent task structure. Values
of pi = 0 denote no belief; values of 1 denote the strongest structural belief. The model with
high belief values predicts most participants best in Experiment 2. Note: Model fit was
measured as mean squared error (MSE); we used trials t = 2 to t = max(t)− 200 to obtain
the values. (e) Joint distribution of the obtained parameter values. Squares show which
parameter combinations occurred; darker colors denote higher occurrence frequencies.
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determined (as in Experiment 1) by selecting parameter values such that each prediction
differed by more than 1 percentage point from predictions with pi = 0, across trials 2 to
100.
Goodness of fit. Comparing how well the extreme versions of the model (the DISC-
LM that can learn flexible dependencies and the one that always uses class-conditional
independence) predict early and late learning behavior shows that the class-conditional-
independence DISC-LM performs better for early choices but worse for later data. In the
first ten trials the class-conditional independence model outperforms a flexible independence
model for 19 of 28 participants; this holds for 0 participants in the last ten trials. The
differences in fit (fitpi=1− fitpi=0) are positive for the early and negative for the late trials.14
Figure 7c shows a trend favoring the class-conditional-independence model in the first ten
trials (positive small mean fit difference of 2 percentage points, t(27) = 1.86, p = .07); while
in the last ten trials the class-conditional-independence DISC-LM performs worse (negative
mean fit difference of −4 percentage points, t(27) = −2.93, p = .006).15
Model accuracy. We obtained the best parameter values by individual trial-by-
trial predictive fitting as described for Experiment 1. There was one tie where two pi values
resulted in equal MSE scores. We conservatively selected the lower pi value for a lower
belief in class-conditional independence. The model’s accuracy for the resulting parameter
values, averaged across the 29 participants, was 84.12%. A model that does not believe
in class-conditional independence (pi = 0 and best-fitting δ values) has 82.83% accuracy,
which yields a mean difference of 1 percentage point, (t(29) = 1.44, p = .16). Here, only the
qualitative direction indicates that a pi = 0model describes behavior less well. There are two
plausible reasons for the rather small accuracy difference in Experiment 2. First, in about
38 of 100 trials, when the uncritical stimulus is drawn, the models make the same choice
prediction irrespective of pi (see Table 2). Re-computing the accuracy without stimulus 111
yields mean accuracy values of 79.34% and 77.58% (mean difference = 2 percentage points,
t(28) = 1.80, p = .09) between the best-fitting-parameter and the flexible-dependency DISC-
LM. The second reason is that after the structural belief parameter is updated to pˆi = 0
(which happens quickly, after about 50 trials; see the lower panel in Fig. 4b), both models
become indistinguishable. Experiment 2 involves many more late learning trials (median
number of trials 627, vs 338 in Experiment 1), increasing the difficulty of discriminating
the models based on the average fit to all trials.
Initial beliefs in class-conditional independence. If learners are initially
guided by high prior beliefs in class-conditional independence, this should be reflected in
high parameter values of pi. In line with this, we obtained values of pi ≥ .9 for the ma-
jority of participants (see Fig. 7d; Fig. 7e shows joint results for both parameters). As
in Experiment 1, few participants (4 of 29) were best described by a fully flexible model
with no beliefs in class-conditional independence. The behavior of most participants (20
of 29) was best accounted for by strong beliefs in class-conditional independence, with pi
values of 0.99 or higher. Similar to Experiment 1, the joint distribution of prior belief and
conservatism parameter in Fig. 7e reveals slower learning for a subset of the participants
with high structural priors (initial belief in class-conditional independence). Thus, Exper-
14Again, we computed the fit for pi = 0 and pi = 1 given individually adjusted δ values.
15Again, the number of subjects used for this analysis is lower than the total number (29) because one
subject had less than 20 (10 early, 10 late) learning trials.
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iment 2’s results support the hypothesis that class-conditional independence is a default
assumption in human classification learning.
Comparison to Single Dimensional Classification
Initially presuming class-conditional independence is one way to cope with the com-
binatorial explosion in classification learning. But it is not the only way. A different rather
simple model uses only one feature to classify, which is a strategy that would fail in our
environment just like the class-conditional independence assumption.
To compare how well another simplifying assumption represents our data, we fitted a
single feature attention model to participants’ data and compared it to the fit of the class-
conditional independence assumption embedded in the DISC-LM. The single feature model
was formalized as restricted version of the Generalized Context Model (GCM, Nosofsky,
1986). The model assumes that participants classify the current stimulus based on how
similar the features of the current stimulus are to the previous stimuli. The current ex-
emplar is classified into the class with most similar exemplars. The GCM has attention
weight parameters allocating attention to particular feature dimensions (for formal details
see Nosofsky (1986)). We used a GCM with city-block metric and exponential decay, with
attention weights fixed to one dimension, and fitted the discriminability c as a free pa-
rameter by maximum likelihood. The attention weights can be restricted in three ways
(attending to only the first, second, or third dimension). For each participant, we selected
the single feature attention allocation that described the participant’s data best.
The single feature model achieved a fit in terms of 1-MSE, averaged across partici-
pants, of 77.87% compared to 86.71% by the DISC-LM in Experiment 1 (t(51) = −7.419, p <
.001). In Experiment 2 the single feature model achieved a fit of 79.54% vs. 88.78% by
the DISC-LM (t(49) = −10.835, p < .001, both tests with Welch–Satterthwaite correction).
The DISC-LM outperformed the single feature model for 28 of 29 participants in Experiment
1 and for 29 of 29 participants in Experiment 2.
General Discussion
A variety of theoretical arguments and machine learning results suggest that the as-
sumption of class-conditional independence of features could be very helpful in probabilistic
category learning. Research to date with human subjects has not specifically focused on this
question. We used computer simulations to identify statistical environments in which learn-
ers who presume class-conditional independence will make strongly different classification
decisions than fully flexible learners.
With a new Bayesian learning model, the DISC-LM, we formalized the class-
conditional independence assumption in order to study the kinds of inferences that would
be made over the course of learning, according to whether or how strongly one initially
presumes class-conditional independence. Different versions of the DISC-LM, with different
prior beliefs about environmental structure, showed very different patterns of learning tra-
jectories, especially early in learning. Importantly, the DISC-LM learns, over time, whether
or not class-conditional dependence holds and adjusts its beliefs and classification decisions
accordingly. Based on the model behavior we derived a number of specific predictions for
human learners’ behavior, on the same tasks.
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Experiment 1 consisted of a deterministic classification learning task designed to
optimally discriminate between people who treat features as class-conditionally independent
and those who do not. The task involved four critical stimuli, for which classifications
derived assuming class-conditional feature independence disagreed with the class choices
derived from the true feature dependencies, and one uncritical stimulus, for which the
independence assumptions did not entail diverging classifications. Participants made more
classification errors for the critical stimuli than for the uncritical stimulus. Participants
also learned the critical stimuli more slowly compared to the uncritical stimulus. This
stagnation in learning was predicted only by models with nonzero prior belief in class-
conditional independence. We also modeled individual choices using the DISC-LM. Most
participants’ classification decisions were best predicted by versions of the model with very
high prior beliefs in class-conditional feature independence.
Experiment 2 followed a similar rationale but used a probabilistic task, to reflect that
most real-world categorization environments are not deterministic (either inherently or due
to incomplete knowledge). Results replicated the first experiment: Most participants’ initial
classification decisions were best accounted for by a DISC-LM with a high prior belief in
class-conditional independence.
Results from all analyses, across both experiments, found that models that place
extremely strong (but not 100%) initial belief in class-conditional independence best ac-
count for human behavior. Note that the version of the DISC-LM that does not correct
its initial assumption of class-conditional independence (i.e., pi = 1) did not capture par-
ticipants’ behavior; neither did a version of the model that allowed for completely flexible
conditional feature interactions (i.e., pi = 0) throughout learning. The model best captur-
ing behavior was one that dynamically adapted to the environmental structure. Although
class-conditional independence performs well across many environmental structures, people
can learn from experience to overcome their structural prior beliefs when the learning input
contradicts their assumptions.
We used environments with three binary features, and two binary categories. The
literature includes many tasks with two or three features (e.g., Meder and Nelson, 2012; Re-
hder and Burnett, 2005; Sanborn, Griffiths, and Navarro, 2010; Vigo, 2013; but see Nosofsky
et al., 1994); thus we had a priori reason to believe that such tasks would be learnable. In
environments with more than three features, the curse of dimensionality is stronger. Thus,
making a simplifying initial assumption, such as class-conditional independence, would be
even more important in more complex environments.
The late learning behavior, in which our participants had learned the category struc-
ture, can potentially be described by various models. It may be described with an exemplar-
based strategy, which can learn exclusive-OR structures such as our task environments
(Nosofsky, 1992). Late learning may alternatively be described with a rule-plus-exception
strategy, for example, "classify as class 1 if all features = 1, otherwise classify as class 2,
except if all features = 0." Early learning could be modeled by, for example, Anderson’s
(1991) rational model of categorization or the model by Sanborn, Griffiths, and Navarro,
2006, starting with a single cluster fully implementing class-conditional independence. As
noted before, our purpose was not to develop a new categorization model, but rather to
test whether participants bring a specific assumption that is justified from a computational
perspective (class-conditional independence) when learning novel categorization tasks.
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It should be noted that the probabilistic DISC-LM is situated at Marr’s computational
level (Marr, 1982) and does not make claims about the underlying cognitive information-
processing steps. We designed the model to test a specific hypothesis about people’s behav-
ior, rather than a cognitive process model. The insights from our studies of the DISC-LM
and human learners are potentially relevant to researchers building various kinds of learning
models. It should also be noted that, at the computational level, only the class-conditional
independence principle itself addresses the curse of dimensionality; the computations un-
derlying the late-learning behavior of the DISC-LM themselves are subject to the curse of
dimensionality.
Issues for Future Empirical Research and Development of the DISC-LM
Our data suggest that in the kinds of tasks that we studied, people have strong prior
assumptions of class-conditional independence. It is possible that people would bring differ-
ent assumptions to other tasks. For instance, radially symmetric organisms (like starfish)
might be presumed to have highly correlated individual arms. Suppose that the presence
of a red spot on an individual arm favors class 1. If the arms are presumed to be highly
correlated with each other (almost to the point of redundancy), observation of a red spot on
an additional arm would provide little additional information in favor of class 1, and class-
conditional independence would not apply (for similar discussions regarding the Markov
condition see Cartwright, 1993; Hausman, 1999; Park & Sloman, 2013). This intuition
could be incorporated into a different, additional component of the DISC-LM.
Other steps in developing the DISC-LM include (a) to test the predictions that it pro-
vides about the development of the learners’ beliefs about the structure of the task (Fig. 4),
and (b) to translate the assumption of class-conditional independence into specific process
model predictions, by tweaking the model such that it predicts a second, independent data
dimension such as reaction times or electroencephalogram data or gaze pattern (Jarecki,
Tan, & Jenny, 2016), in addition to choice predictions.
Implication for Strategy Selection. Our findings complement studies on how
people adapt decision and inference strategies to the nature of a task (Gigerenzer, Todd, &
the ABC Research Group, 1999; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; Gluth, Rieskamp, & Büchel,
2014; Lieder & Griffiths, 2015; Marewski & Schooler, 2011; Mata, von Helversen, &
Rieskamp, 2011; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). For instance,
Gluth et al., 2014 found evidence in multiple-cue inference tasks that people’s behavior and
neuronal data is best described by a model formalizing dynamic switches between decision
strategies over time. Our approach shows that beliefs about the nature of the task (feature
dependencies) could at least implicitly be a guiding principle by which people learn to adapt
inference strategies.
Implications for Knowledge-Specific Learning. Our data also informs the lit-
erature on the interaction between the context of a task and the specific structural knowledge
that people apply. For example, participants in an experiment by Wattenmaker, Dewey,
Murphy, and Medin (1986) expected to learn a linearly separable categorization structure
when the cover story of a person-classification task was such that the features of one category
coincided with aspects of one personality trait. However, participants did not expect linear
separability when the features associated with one category belonged to different charac-
ter traits. Thus, background knowledge influences structural assumptions during learning.
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Our findings show that even despite strong structural expectations, people can overcome
their initial beliefs and fully adapt to a novel environmental structure. Thus, our findings
emphasize the dynamic and adaptable nature of structural assumptions.
Implications for Causal Reasoning. In the literature on causal reasoning,
conditional-independence assumptions have been investigated within the causal Markov
condition in Bayes nets theory (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes et al., 1993). At least two aspects of our
results have potential implications for this literature. The first implication is that whether
people expect class-conditional independence to hold may depend on whether learning is
through experience or from explicit verbal descriptions, and on whether choice behavior or
explicit numerical judgments are measured. Causal reasoning studies (e.g., Mayrhofer &
Waldmann, 2014; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005) often measure probability judgments about fea-
ture occurrences after giving participants an explicit description of a situation. Our results
suggest that more implicit, behavioral, and learning-based measures may reduce violations
of the causal Markov condition. This suggests an alternative methodological approach for
investigating independence assumptions in causal learning and reasoning. Secondly, the
dynamic adaptation of structural beliefs we found in our experiments may also hold for the
degree of Markov violations in causal reasoning. Causal reasoning studies could adapt a
similar paradigm by investigating causal inference in environments in which the data does
or does not warrant the validity of the causal Markov condition. This approach enables
systematically investigating the match between people’s assumptions and inferences, the
presumed causal structure of the environment, and the available learning data (e.g., von
Sydow, Hagmayer, & Meder, 2016).
Beyond Simplicity in Early Category Learning
Our findings emphasize the transition between inference strategies during learning. In
this sense they are consistent with the finding that in the early stages of category learning
people employ a simpler inference and categorization strategy and then gradually learn
more computationally intense strategies (Love et al., 2004; J. D. Smith & Minda, 1998).
Our work extends these findings by adding a notion of robustness to the notion of simplicity.
The simple initial categorization strategy we proposed—assuming class-conditional feature
independence—is additionally a robust strategy that often leads to accurate classification,
despite its unrealistically simplistic structural assumptions (Domingos & Pazzani, 1997;
Rish et al., 2001). In this sense, class-conditional independence can be viewed as a heuristic
default assumption, providing an efficient means to reduce computational complexity, which
works well in many situations.
Early in learning, when little information has been obtained, it is helpful to have com-
putationally simple strategies that facilitate making inferences and decisions. But simplicity
is not a virtue if it only works in very few selected statistical environments. Robustness
to violation of initial assumptions is also important for cognitive systems to guard against
potentially costly mistakes. Simple and robust strategies for early inferences may buy time
to gather more experience, and adapt to the nuances of an environment’s structure. The
literature on strategy transitions in categorization is limited with respect to the question of
whether the models proposed for early learning, for example prototype or linearly separable
models, are robust. Our results show that people may use strategies that get the best of
simplicity, robustness, and adaptability.
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Appendix A
Simulation results: Conservatism Parameter δ
Fig. A1 shows simulation results of the DISC-LM where we vary the conservatism parameter
δ and the values of the prior structural belief parameter pi. Each of N = 200 simulated
subjects experienced stimuli drawn at random from the deterministic task environment
(panel a, at top). A separate 200 simulated subjects experienced stimuli drawn at random
from the probabilistic environment (panel b, at bottom).
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Figure A1 . Simulation of learning given different values of the conservatism parameter δ.
The higher the value of δ, the slower the learning for all stimuli. Higher values of pi affect the
critical stimuli but not the uncritical stimulus 111. CCI = class-conditional independence.
Appendix B
Experimental instruction: Feedback during learning
The feedback that participants received every 100 trials was as follows:
How are you doing? If you continue responding like in the last 200 trials, you will
average about x% correct. The optimal strategy achieves about y%.
Mini-FAQ: Q: I’ve only learned one feature. Is that okay? A: No. More than one
feature matters. You must learn all the features to be able to learn to categorize the plankton
specimen.
The variable x was the accuracy that would be achieved on average if the partici-
pant would respond in the same way as in the most recent 200 trials, and the stimulus
configurations would occur exactly according to their average frequencies. The variable y
was the maximum achievable average accuracy, if stimuli would occur according to their
average frequencies. (Each stimulus was chosen at random according to the theoretical
frequencies of occurrence, in each trial in the learning task. Because of this, a participant’s
actual accuracy is typically not identical to the theoretical accuracy that would be achieved
by their pattern of responses to the various stimuli.) Both numbers were rounded to the
nearest tenth of a percent. See Tables 1 and 2 for the expected classification accuracies
P (class | stimulus) in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, respectively.
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Supplementary Material
Naïve and Robust: Class-Conditional Independence in Human
Classification Learning
Supplement A
Details of the Model and Simulation
Symbols
A complete list of symbols used throughout the main text and appendices is given
below.
C is the class random variable, C ∈ {c1, c2}, meaning class 1 or class 2
S is the stimulus random variable, let S ∈ {s1, . . . , s8}, meaning stimulus 000, 001, 010,
011, 100, 101, 110, 111
P (si | cj) likelihood of stimulus i given class j, if the subscripts are omitted P (s | c) denotes
the likelihood of any stimulus s1, . . . s8 given a class
P (cj) base rate of class j, if the subscript is omitted P (c) denotes P (c1)
P (fd | cj) denotes the likelihood of feature d given class j, if the subscripts are omitted
P (f | c) denotes the likelihood of any feature given a class
d indexes feature dimensions and d ∈ {1, 2, 3}, meaning the first, second, third marginal
feature
t indexes trials; trials are integers starting from 1; t ∈ N+.
δ is the DISC-LM’s conservatism parameter and δ ≥ 1; it is a free parameter in the
DISC-LM16
pi is the DISC-LM’s prior belief in class-conditional feature independence,
P (class conditional independence holds), before experiencing the environment,
pi ∈ [0, 1]; it is a free parameter of the DISC-LM
pˆi is the DISC-LM’s posterior belief in class-conditional feature independence, after expe-
riencing the environment, pˆi ∈ [0, 1]
Monte-Carlo Simulation Procedure
The DISC-LM infers the class base rate and the stimulus likelihoods in a Bayesian
way. We employed Monte Carlo simulations to numerically estimate the required probability
densities. The simulations and analyses were programmed in R (R Core Team, 2014).
We approximated the densities with Monte Carlo simulations using 100,000 draws.
To obtain the point estimate from the simulated densities the model uses the posterior
mean.
The flowchart in Fig. S1 illustrates the steps of the Monte Carlo procedure. The upper
part shows the procedure to simulate the inference of the class; the lower part shows how
we simulated the match between the structural assumptions about feature independence
and the data (for the Bayesian model averaging).
16Note: From a mathematical standpoint, the conservatism parameter δ could be also be smaller than
one. From the perspective of a model with δ = 1, a model with δ < 1 exhibits base-rate neglect and learns
too quickly (Bar-Hillel, 1980), and a model with δ > 1 shows conservatism and learns too slowly (Edwards,
1967).
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Figure S1 . Illustration of Monte Carlo simulation of the class prediction in the DISC-LM. White
boxes (top-left): How the FLEX model estimates the class prediction. Grey boxes (top-right): How
the CCI model estimates the class prediction. White boxes (bottom-left): How the FLEX model
estimates the likelihood that the world complies with its structure given the previously experienced
data. Grey boxes (bottom-right): How the CCI model estimates the likelihood that the world complies
with its structure given the previously experienced data. In the very last row the two predictions
are weighted and added in the Bayesian mixture model. Note: The chart assumes that at least one
stimulus and class were observed (in other words, the trial equals trial 2 or higher).
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The Model (DISC-LM)
The model computes the probability that the next stimulus si belongs to class 1
P (c1 | si) in each trial by
P (c1 | si) = P (si) P (c1)
P (si | c1)P (c1) + P (s | c2)P (c2) , (S1)
where the probability that i belongs to class 2 is 1− P (c1 | s).
The model infers the class base rate, P (c1), and the stimulus likelihoods, P (si | c),
required for Equation S1 by Bayesian inference.
Conceptual Overview. We first sketch the conceptual differences between a prob-
abilistic Bayesian learning model that accounts for the interactions among the features given
the class and a model that assumes features to be class-conditionally independent.
A model accounting for the interactions among features given the class infers the
class base rate P (c) as parameter of a Bernoulli distribution. It infers the stimulus likeli-
hoods, P (s | c), given class 1 and class 2 as parameters of an eight-parameter categorical
distribution (in fact it estimates seven parameters, as ∑i P (si | c) = 1).
Pˆ (c | s) =
Categorical︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pˆ (s | c)
Bernoulli︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pˆ (c)∑
c Pˆ (s | c)Pˆ (c)
, (S2)
where Pˆ means that the probability was inferred, as compared to the true value denoted
by P .
A model assuming that features are independent given the class infers the class base
rate as before. It infers the marginal feature likelihoods instead of the configural (joint)
stimulus likelihoods. The feature likelihoods are multiplied by Equation 2 to obtain the
stimulus likelihoods.
Pˆ (c | s) =
∏
d
Three Bernoulli︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pˆ (fd | c)
Bernoulli︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pˆ (c)∑
c
∏
d Pˆ (fd | c)Pˆ (c)
, (S3)
where d = 1, 2, 3 indexes features.
To minimize Monte Carlo error, posterior point estimates were rounded to the fourth
decimal place.
Estimation of the posterior density of the class base rate. For an intro-
duction to Bayesian inference, the reader is referred to Griffiths, Vul, and Sanborn (2012).
The prior density of the class 1 base rate is given by p(P (c1)) = Beta(δ, δ). The posterior
density of the class 1 base rate after the model experienced t exemplars in the data is
p
(
Pˆt(c1) | data
)
= Beta (δ + nt(c1), δ + nt(c2)) , (S4)
where nt(c1), nt(c2) are frequencies of class 1 and class 2 until trial t, respectively.
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Inferring the stimulus likelihoods assuming flexible dependencies of the features
given the class
Let us turn to how the stimulus likelihoods are inferred when the DISC-LM makes no
independence assumption (i.e., pi = 0) about the interactions of the features given the class.
The prior density of the stimulus likelihoods given class 1 is identical to the one given class 2
and is given by p(P (s | c)) = Dirichlet(δ, δ, δ, δ, δ, δ, δ, δ). The hyper-parameter δ is identical
to the δ we saw before, in the prior distribution of the class base rate. The posterior density
of the stimulus likelihoods given class 1 in trial t after the model experienced data (stimuli)
is
p(Pˆt(s | c) | data) = Dirichlet (δ + nt(s1|c), . . . , δ + nt(s8|c)) (S5)
where nt(si|c) are the frequencies of the stimuli given either class 1 until trial t. The
likelihood given class 2 is inferred in the same way, only counting stimuli which belonged
to class 2.
Inferring the stimulus likelihoods assuming independence of the features given
the class
The model assuming class-conditional feature independence infers the marginal fea-
ture likelihoods for each feature separately. The prior distribution of the marginal feature
likelihood of feature d is p(P (fd | c)) = Beta(δ, δ) ∀ d = 1, 2, 3. Again δ is identical to the
one used for the class base rate inference. The posterior density of the marginal feature
likelihood of feature d given class 1 in trial t after the model has experienced data is
p(Pˆt(fd|c) | data) = Beta (δ + nt(fd|c), δ + t− 1− nt(fd|c)) (S6)
where nt(fd|c) is the frequency of feature d given class 1 until trial t. The feature likelihoods
given class 2 are inferred in the same way.
The posterior densities of all d features given one class were multiplied (Equation 2)
to obtain the posterior densities of the stimulus likelihoods given the classes. The inferred
stimulus likelihoods converge to the true likelihoods if class-conditional independence holds
in the environment.
Bayesian model averaging
Combining the inferred densities of the class base rate and the stimulus likelihoods by
Equation S1 and taking the mean of the resulting density yields the point estimate of the
probability that stimulus s belongs to class c in trial t given flexible feature dependencies,
and given class-conditional independence.
The DISC-LM computes the final probability that stimulus s belongs to class c in
trial t as a weighted average:
Pˆt(c | s) = pˆi Pˆt(c | s; cci) + (1− pˆi) Pˆt(c | s; flex), (S7)
where 0 ≤ pˆi ≤ 1, and flex and cci denote that the point estimate was generated using
flexible feature dependencies or class-conditional feature independence, respectively.
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The posterior structural belief pˆi is the mean of the density p(pˆi | data), i.e. the density
of the posterior structural belief given data until trial t, which is given by
p(pˆi | data) = p(data | P (s, c; cci)) · pi
p(data) , (S8)
where pi is the prior structural belief. The denominator is a normalizing term: p(data) =
p(data | P (s, c; cci))pi + p(data | P (s, c; flex))(1− pi).
The density of the likelihood of the data given class-conditional independence, p(data |
P (s, c; cci)), is computed by
p(data | P (s, c; cci)) =
∏
i
∏
j
P (si, cj ; cci)ni,j,t (S9)
where P (si, cj ; cci) = P (si | cj ; cci) · P (cj), and ni,j,t is the occurrence frequency of stimulus
i together with class j until trial t. The density of the likelihood of the data given flexible
conditional feature dependencies, p(data | P (s, c; flex)), is computed in the same way
except for substituting Pˆ (si | cj ; cci) by Pˆ (si | cj ; flex).
We log-transformed this calculation to avoid numerical errors.
Supplement B
Optimal Experimental Design
This section describes how we designed the task structure. Remember that we aimed
for a task with three binary features and one binary class. We used a genetic algorithm
to find parameters such that the two computations (computing the likelihoods using the
configural stimuli vs. using the marginal features) entailed maximally different posterior
class probabilities across the eight possible feature configurations.
The statistical environment is defined by the class base rates, the likelihoods of the
eight feature configurations given class 1, and the corresponding likelihoods given class 2.
Given these quantities, the posterior probability with which each stimulus belongs to class 1
and class 2 can be computed via Equation 1. We can then derive the marginal feature
likelihoods and recompute the probability that the stimulus belongs to class 1 assuming
class-conditional independence (Equation 2). We employed numeric optimization methods
using a genetic algorithm to find environmental probabilities that implied different class
decisions depending on whether the posterior probabilities were computed presuming class-
conditional independence or not.
The optimization used hill climbing. It selected one set of parameters randomly
and computed the probability with which each stimulus belong to class 1 in the two ways
outlined above. On the basis of this result, the algorithm assigned a fitness value to the
solution (see Equation S10). Then it modified the set of starting parameters iteratively,
aiming for higher fitness. The process repeated until convergence.
Formally, the algorithm iteratively maximized the sum of the following occurrence-
weighted probability differences:
8∑
j=1
(P (c1 | sj ; cci)− P (c1 | sj ; flex))2 · P (sj)2 (S10)
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Table C1
Recovery of pi and δ in Environment 1
Fit Measure |pi - pˆi| SD of |pi - pˆi| |δ - δˆ| SD of |δ - δˆ|
1 MSE 0.2033 0.0285 33.0909 0.0000
2 MAE 0.2055 0.0293 33.1502 0.1453
3 LogLik 0.2065 0.0296 33.0909 0.0000
Shown are the differences between means. pˆi = recovered value, pi =
true value (similar for δ).
Table C2
Recovery of pi and δ in Environment 2
Fit Measure |pi - pˆi| SD of |pi - pˆi| |δ - δˆ| SD of |δ - δˆ|
1 MAE 0.1492 0.0762 33.0909 0.0000
2 MSE 0.1520 0.0905 33.0909 0.0000
3 LogLik 0.2817 0.2551 33.0909 0.0000
Shown are the differences between means. pˆi = recovered value, pi =
true value (similar for δ).
where sj denotes the eight possible stimuli, c1 class 1, and cci and flex denote whether
the posterior probability of the class was computed directly from the configural stimulus
likelihoods or by multiplying the marginal feature likelihoods according to (Equation 2).
The first part of the product computes the difference between the classification probability
assuming class-conditional independence, P (c1 | sj ; cci), and the classification probability
assuming flexible dependencies (i.e., arbitrary configural likelihoods), P (c1 | sj ; flex). The
second part of the product weights the (squared) difference by the frequency of the stimulus.
Squaring both terms favors large probability differences over small differences, and frequent
over infrequent stimuli. Favoring rather frequent stimuli ensured that participants could
actually learn the task. We set the summand to zero if both class probabilities pointed
toward the same class, that is, were both < .5 or > .5.
Supplement C
Parameter Recovery
We simulated the DISC-LM with fixed pi and δ parameters for the learning sequences that
participants observed in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, in order to determine which
goodness of fit measure would recover the parameters best. We considered mean absolute
error (MAE), mean squared error (MSE), and log likelihood (LogLik). We compared the
deviations between the median pˆi estimates and the true values of pi used to simulate the
data.
Table C1 shows the deviations between true and recovered values with learning data
from Environment 1. The table shows the deviations for pi values, averaged across δ values,
in units of pi. It also shows the deviations for δ values, averaged across pi values, in units
of δ. Table C2 shows analogous results for the probabilistic Environment 2. Table C1 and
Table C2 order the fit measures according to abs(pi − pˆi). We used MSE in our analyses
because it was best in Environment 1, second best in Environment 2, and is the more
common measure (as compared with MAE) in the literature.
